On a debate with a good friend recently I had to explain why I am pessimistic on the prospect that any discussions on the Greek debt can be final.
As a result of this refusal to accept responsibility, inevitably the Greeks have lost credibility in international negotiations. No small part to this has to do with image management. The former economics minister was making the sartorial statement of a middle aged clubber in Mykonos, the current one looks like he just got off the bus from the rough part of town. These guys will speak the language of Europe’s bankers? They will elicit empathy for Greece’s plight? The difference between being idiosyncratic, tolerated as couleur local and seen as irrelevant is not big. And the Greek negotiators have saddly crossed that threshold of credibility.
I think obvious that making further economic sacrifices without debt restructuring just transfers and aggravates a high debt problem to a future date. I also think restructuring without engaging in serious administrative reforms is pointless. In simple terms, the current government has played bad politics to deal with bad economics. But their signals (statements and actions) aimed at their domestic political clientèle contradict any signals of credibility to its foreign partnerts that demand administrative restructuring. The Syriza rallying cry of “honour and pride” is what I consider a smokescreen. This is populism 101.
There are many commentators, like Mark Blyth in Foreign Affairs, that have offered a good overview of why Greece is not to blame. But that does not change the fact that private investors to Greek bonds have aready received a significant haircut and that the money owed has been borrowed.
[Caution: the following paragraph is my first attempt at science fiction]
What should a Greek government unencumbered by clientelistic politics, populism and corruption do? They should have produced restructuring plans with realistic assumptions of growth, policies to improve business confidence and reasoned arguments on how the Greek debt should be handled. This would have implied tackling head-on entreneched interests (lawyers, pharmacists, unions etc); getting civil servants to recognise that they work for the public interest and not the other way around; reinviogarting the legal system to reduce average time to a decision from 4 years to 4 months; upbraiding law and buraucracy to be fit for purpose; demolishing the interconnected interests of public media and oligarchs; tackling the pensions and insurance time-bomb (currently 17% of GDP!). The human talent exists, and all this is feasible. The only thing missing in such a solution are political actors not interested in re-election and I am hard-pressed to think of any such, not because they are universally corrupt but because they are universally self-important. A polity that can reform and improve its discourse can then act as an example to others. Greece is a testbed of the impact of high levels of debt on an economically integrated, (semi) developed and peripheral state. Many in EU’s periphery qualify for that definition. Instead of Greece being an example of how it can be done it is the exact opposite.
As for the level of debt. It is obvious that this debt cannot be serviced at the present state of the Greek economy. The issue with Greece’s partners should be framed in terms of the ethics of growth (and not of evil capitalism as the current incumbents are doing). If it is framed as a long term commitment on a 0% coupon the “capitalist ethic” of Greece’s partners is not offended. Within that ethic there are multiple arguments why the debt should be reduced. If Greece can attain average growth and a balanced budget, in 30 years it will be well below current average debt obligations in the eurozone. For instance, Greece can resume servicing its debt when it is below 60% of GDP as prescribed by EU treaties. This does not mean running recessionary budgets, just a necessity to balance their budgets across the business cycle.
ON SYRIZA POLITICS, plagiarising myself from an earlier entry on this blog:
This is the best analysis that I have read anywhere.At this point,a deal with Greece invites lots of moral hazard.What to do with Spain and Italy if their situations deteriorate?As well,the wolf may be at the door.Erdogan did not fare so well in the last elections and interving to assist his ‘oppressed brothers’ in Thrace certainly would help his popularity.It worked for Putin.-V. Raymond Busteigh
Dimitris
Great post. (are you paid per word 🙂
I think the best way to explain it to your students is like this;
The Greeks faked their over-18 ID to get into the nightclub. Now they blame the bouncers – because they didn’t have any cash to pay the barman. And then they refuse to do the washing up. And now they’re fighting everyone with their shirts off on the pavement – and about to vomit up a gallon of unpaid for bacardi breezer …and get the nightclub shutdown.
______ An average night out in Mykonos? ____
Keep on bloggin’
Kind Regards
Tom
Salthouse & Peppermongers Office: 01292 292018 Tom Mobile : 07734240779 North Harbour, Ayr KA8 8AE
This e-mail message may contain confidential or legally privileged information and is intended only for the use of the intended recipient(s). Any unauthorized disclosure, dissemination, distribution, copying or the taking of any action in reliance on the information herein is prohibited. E-mails are not secure and cannot be guaranteed to be error free as they can be intercepted, amended, or contain viruses. Anyone who communicates with us by e-mail is deemed to have accepted these risks. Company Name is not responsible for errors or omissions in this message and denies any responsibility for any damage arising from the use of e-mail. Any opinion and other statement contained in this message and any attachment are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the company.
>